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The present study had sought the concepts and meanings of Justice in the works of 
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics), Hans Kelsen (Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit – The 
Problem of Justice) and John Rawls (A Theory of Justice). After this, the study has 
analyzed the ideas presented by John Rawls in "Justice as Equity", which are the 
foundation for a more specific insight about tax justice. The Rawlsian concept, from 
which the study started, was that justice would be "an appropriate balance between 
conflicting demands". Then it has analyzed some situations of what tax injustices in 
the Brazilian Tax Legislation would be. Finally, it has concluded that an approximate 
idea of tax justice is in the fair balance between the concerns of the taxpayer and the 
State, which equitably establishes the size of the social minimum and the fair savings 
rate, as well as it avoids high inequality at the top of the income distribution through 
tax proportionality, which could limit equal opportunities and would inhibit economic 
growth.  
 




O presente trabalho buscou conceitos e significados de Justiça nas obras de 
Aristóteles (Ética a Nicômaco), Hans Kelsen (O problema da Justiça) e John Rawls 
(Uma teoria da Justiça). Após isso analisou-se os institutos defendidos por John Rawls 
em “Justiça como Equidade” para, com base nestes, edificar uma noção mais 
específica de justiça fiscal. O conceito rawlsiano de que se partiu foi que o da justiça 
como “equilíbrio apropriado entre exigências conflitantes”. Em seguida analisou-se 
algumas situações de injustiça fiscal na legislação tributária brasileira. Ao fim, 
concluiu-se que uma ideia próxima de justiça fiscal passa pelo justo equilíbrio entre os 
interesses do contribuinte e do Estado, que estabeleça, de forma equitativa, o 
tamanho do mínimo social e da taxa de poupança justa, bem como, utilizando-se da 
proporcionalidade tributária, evite elevada desigualdade no topo da distribuição de 
renda, o que limitaria a igualdade de oportunidades e inibiria do crescimento 
econômico. 
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Justice: that is such a complex concept1 in philosophy, as well as good, 
happiness, virtue, fairness, proportionality and reasonableness. There is much debate 
about it, and to this day, there is not an irrefutable meaning in the philosophy of law, 
alike to what happens with the other values mentioned above. 
Regarding proportionality and reasonableness concepts, it can be mentioned 
that, in instrumental standings, law has been bounding its meanings. In proportionality, 
there is extensive precedents, beginning with the specification of this principle by the 
German Constitutional Court2, then it has been systematized and polished in the theory 
of Human Rights by Robert Alexy3. As for the concept of reasonableness, from its deep 
rootedness in the Common Law system – the Wednesbury precedent in England4 -, 
heading to a common ground in the Civil Law system, it is possible to work safely 
around it. 
For Justice, however, there is no consensus around its concept, one dares to 
say that there is no concept at all for it. For the philosophy of law, despite the absence 
of definition, justice is related to the specific values of the most diverse societies and 
to the systems by which those values are legitimately affirmed, even though coercively. 
The dictionary of philosophy of Nicola Abbagnano (2007) gives the word 
"justice" the concept of an order of human relations, of a conformity of the conduct with 
the norm, whether it is moral or of law. Not very different is the concept given by 
                                                          
1 In this work the author brings extensive philosophical definitions about the word “concept”. “Concept” 
is meant as “every process that makes possible the description, classification and prediction of knowable 
objects (...)”.Concept is not a simple or indivisible element, but it can be constituted by a set of extremely 
complex symbolic techniques, as it is the case of scientific theories that can also be called 'concept', 
such as Concept of Relativity, Concept of Evolution, etc. (ABBAGNANO, 2007, p. 164).  
2 The doctrine regards the Luth Case as the milestone in terms of the objective dimension of fundamental 
rights, effectiveness of these rights and the rule of weighting, in case of collision of such rights. 
3 The two main books regarding the Principle of Proportionality are: “The theory of fundamental rights”, 
in which Alexy laid the foundations of his theory, and "Epilogue to the theory of fundamental rights", a 
latter work, engaged in rebating the criticisms thrown at the previous book. 
4 In short: No reasonable person acting reasonably could have made it. (Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948)). 
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Norberto Bobbio, Nicola Matteucci e Gianfranco Pasquino (1998) in his dictionary of 
politics, in the sense that justice serves to a social purpose, in the same way as 
freedom, equality, democracy or welfare, but justice differs from them because it is not 
empirically verifiable. Subsequently he gives in and defines justice as a normative 
concept. 
However, it is noticed that efforts to delimit and define the concept of Justice 
traverse the most varied approaches, either by looking at it only as values and thereby 
confusing it as morality and ethics, or by reducing it to a concatenated, homogeneous 
and coherent system of norms, most often in the form of rules. In general, there are 
several theories that explain the legal phenomenon, such as Natura Law, Positivism, 
Exegetical School, Normativism, Historicism, and others, notwithstanding any of them 
to provide a concept of Justice. 
A sheer concept of Justice, albeit, there is no one. For the purpose of this work, 
the option is to extract it from the classic authors, naming Aristotle and Hans Kelsen, 
their ideas around the theme, however not even themselves drew a conclusion about 
the definition of Justice itself. Then, searching for the main scope of this work, which 
is, in the light of John Rawls's Theory of Justice, to frame the general lines on an 
conception of tax justice and, at the end, specifically to point out some occurrences of 
injustice in the Brazilian Tax System. 
 
 
2  AN IDEA OF A FAIR AND PROPORTIONAL JUSTICE IN ARISTOTLE 
 
There are precious lessons about the notion of Justice in the book V of 
Nicomachean Ethics, which expands on Rawls’ “Theory of Justice”. According to 
Aristotle’s idea, Justice is a "disposition of character," which makes people prone to 
act and do according to what is presumably fair. As it can be seen, there is certain 
tautology in this proposition, since it’s dealt as an introduction of the theme. Soon after, 
he goes on to explain that there is a general notion of justice, in which entails several 
types of it, id est, some specific values. 
At first, without saying it directly with these words, Aristotle supports that 
Justice is related to moral values. Then, he cites as specific values of injustice: greed, 
improbity, and even the opposite of good. Furthermore, he drops to another "meaning" 
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of it, calling it "particular meaning" of Justice, which is confused with the law, asserting 
it as "unfair, in the broad sense of ‘contrary to law’”. 
The philosopher goes on stating that there is more than one type of Justice, 
one of which is distinguished from virtue, in the full sense of the word, as well as from 
improbity, but always as a species-to-gender relation. For Aristotle, at the extremes of 
every kind of Justice there is iniquity: “in every kind of action where there is the most 
and the least, there is also the equal one. If therefore the unjust is iniquitous, the just 
is equitable, as indeed everyone thinks, even without any discussion. Once equality is 
an intermediary point, the just will be a middle ground". 
He clarifies his idea by saying that the notion of equity is always relational, 
whether it be to two persons or to two things, and above all it is intermediate between 
these two things or persons, "which are respectively greater and minors ". The 
measure of this distribution, according to him will be formed by the idea of merit. This 
must occur even if not all of them specify the same kind of merit, since "the democrats 
identify it with the virtue of a free man, the partisans of the oligarchy with the (condition 
of) wealth (or with the nobility of birth), and the partisans of the aristocracy with the 
(condition of) excellence (moral and intellectual)”. 
The unfolding of this idea, as a natural consequence of the measure of merit 
between two extremes, introduces the idea of proportion, being the proportion the 
measure of merit within the intermediary, which is equality. The unjust is the one who 
violates the proportion, once he removes the relation between the whole to the whole, 
and the relation between the part to the part. 
Using the idea of "common possessions", taken in the context of its time, he 
sustains that Justice distribute these possessions accordingly to the ratio. 
Furthermore, under this criterion, the "common assets of a society" should also be 
distributed. 
This means that there is in Aristotle an embryo of distributive justice. This 
inference can be ascertained even in a definitive way, when he says that "we must 
both subtract from the one who has the most and add to the one who has the least; 
and to this we shall add the quantity by which the intermediary one exceeds it, and 
from the one who has the most we will subtract its excess from the intermediary one”. 
Thus, "it is by proportional retribution that the city remains united". 
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Therefore, he concludes stating that justice is a kind of middle ground, related 
to intermediary quantity, whereas injustice relates to extremes. It is also by that that a 
righteous man acts and shares - to himself and to the other ones - without being 
attributed more than it is due or to what is rather proper for the others and gives what 
is equal accordingly to the proportion. On the other hand, injustice is related to excess 
and insufficiency, opposed to the proportion of how useful it may be. 
As it has been expounded, the writings of Aristotle are of major value for the 
notion of justice as the proportional, the equal, and even the middle ground, according 
to the idea of merit. However, not even this great philosopher dared to be categorical 
in the definition of justice, since he claims it to be a general concept on which several 
specific ideas are suitable. 
At this point, moving forward, the analysis of Hans Kelsen theory on “The 
problem of justice” may be useful for the comprehension of the main idea of this paper 
– a contemporaneous concept of tax justice. 
 
 
3  THE (NON)CONCEPT OF JUSTICE ACCORDING TO HANS KELSEN 
 
Another great thinker about the subject of this paper has been the law 
philosopher Hans Kelsen (1998), mostly known by his contributions to the 
systematization of the legal theory as one autonomous science, set in the work "The 
Pure Theory of Law". He pursued to confer scientific approach on the comprehension 
of law, aiming to abolish the intrusion of other branches of knowledge in law, and even 
to separate moral values whenever applying statutes and legal norms5.  
However, the most significant author’s contribution serving for the objectives 
of this text, is the understanding of justice itself – in “The problem of Justice” -, what 
may help the building of an idea of tax justice. In his work, nevertheless, there is not a 
definition of what is justice, but clear-cut definitions of what is not justice. That is why 
the word "non" is in this index subtitle. 
                                                          
5 As a pure science, law does not have the function to decide what is fair, but rather to describe what is 
in fact mandatory without identifying itself with one of those value judgments. 
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In his book "The Problem of Justice (1960)", Hans Kelsen collects several 
meanings that are historically attributed to the phenomenon of justice, highlighting their 
definition and analysis about them. He seeks to deconstruct, from a scientific point of 
view, each one of the existing descriptions for the phenomenon of justice, not being 
definite at the end. 
The author starts stating that justice is a quality or attribute of different objects 
or individuals. In this sense, justice represents a virtue and, as such, belongs to the 
domain of morality. Under this approach, norms that seek to do justice have as a 
validity assumption to be good, fair, etc., whereas the legal norm should not concern 
about that matter. According to him, just in the fundamental hypothetical norm – all 
citizens must obey the Constitution -, one could establish value of justice for the law. 
Then, some inconsistencies are pointed out in the simplest statements of 
definitions of justice. In the formula which he called "suum cuique”, which says "to each 
one what is his own", he states it is understood what is his "by right", that is, according 
to a title or legal claim, therefore something not accurate. Concerning the "Golden 
Rule", which says "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you", Kelsen 
deems it uncertain, pointing the extreme situation where the lie could be something 
fair, if it is directed to someone who accepts it as way of living. 
Then Kelsen goes on to analyze the "Categorical Imperative" of Kant, which 
says: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
should become a universal law ". According to Kelsen, this is most commonly used as 
the general and supreme principle of morality, rather than as a rule of justice. He also 
points to a flaw in Kant's theory, saying that in the case of suicide, the individual maxim 
(the person believes that suicide is better for himself) cannot be transformed into a 
universal maxim. 
Then Kelsen discusses several examples in which his opinion, Kant's maxim 
would not be applicable, as in the case of the borrower who does not want to pay the 
debt or people who would rather have a reckless life to the development of their own 
capacities. 
In the end, Kelsen states that what is left of Kant's rule is only a general law 
with which the maxim of action must adapt: "The need to conform the law is deontic 
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and this is the meaning of all and any norm whatsoever". The content of this norm 
would not be filled by morality, rather by another normative science. 
The author also does not think the retributive principle is the appropriate 
answer to the problem of justice. The retributive norm prescribes that "good must be 
done to one who does good, and evil to one who does evil". It is noticed that this is 
such an empty formula as is the general commandment to do good and keep away 
from evil, for it presumes a normative order that determines what is good and what is 
evil. 
Kelsen continues to deconstruct the concept of justice based on the rules of 
custom, because, being changeable in time and space, they would not give accurate 
answers. On the same basis, he criticizes "the Aristotelian middle ground", once, under 
his view, it would not be manifested. 
The author likewise disagrees with the idea of justice as proportionality, which 
is also found in Aristotle. According to him, in this sense, it must be assumed that 
values have different degrees, something disallowed by Kelsen, since in that sense a 
binary logic would be attributed to normativity. For Kelsen, a conduct cannot relate 
more or less to the norm, being better or worse, since different degrees must reside 
not in the norm itself, but in what it is called “subjective” or personal sense. 
Then he goes further and deepens his criticism on the idea of proportionality 
in the strict sense, taken by the German Constitutional Court in 1958 in the Luth6 Case, 
tried two years before the releasing of the book "The problem of justice", in which he 
dealt proportionality in an approximate sense and not in a strict sense. He advocates 
that proportionality in the strict sense only exists between values in the subjective 
sense, arising from the reaction embodied by the retributive principle. A proportionality 
would only be possible if the values considered were quantitatively measurable, which 
is not the case for him. 
At this point, Kelsen evolves to the analysis of Marx's principle of communist 
justice, which states that must be requested from "each one according to his abilities 
and given to each one according to his needs". For this, he made the same criticism 
                                                          
6 This is the leading case in the study of fundamental rights. The German Constitutional Court developed 
three central ideas: (a) the objective dimension of fundamental rights; (b) the horizontal effectiveness of 
fundamental rights; and (c) the need to weigh the values, in the event of a collision of rights. 
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addressed to the maxim "suum cuique", which, according to him, does not say 
anything. 
Regarding the idea of justice as an absolute good in Plato, Kelsen draws a 
parallel, stating that this idea - absolute good - is for this conception of justice as God 
is for the conception of divine justice. That is, they have as reference something 
transcendent, inaccessible to the men, who is prisoner of his senses. 
However, it was on the natural law that Kelsen focused much of the criticism 
in this work. He sought to assess all types of validation of this great school of the legal 
phenomenon justification, from nature, through God and religious matrices, and even 
through human reason. The core idea behind the critics of natural law does not differ 
from the other deconstructive analyzes he undertook against the other notions of 
justice presented above, always going through subjectivisms, transcendentalism and 
uncertain elements of justice. 
As this addressed book was written in 1960, it faced great criticism on account 
of what was defended by Kelsen in his masterpiece “Pure Theory of Law”, published 
in 1934, and, even under a chronological approach, it can be said that "The problem 
of justice" functions, among other things, as an answer and an attempt to clarify that 
the legal problem differs from the justice problem. Problem that, incidentally, does not 
seem to have been his intention to define it. 
 
 
4  THE “JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS” OF JHON RAWLS AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE STRUCTURE OF AN IDEA OF TAX JUSTICE 
 
In the quest of the idea of justice, having taken Aristotle and his lessons on 
fairness and proportionality, as well as the meaningful work of Hans Kelsen on the 
many understandings of what he called the problem of justice, John Rawls` theory 
about fairness might be useful for the development of this paper.  
This author framed a theory that makes use of the valuable elements of the 
current society (democracy, equality, distributive justice, etc.) and organized them 
giving the fundamentals for building a society he considers the ideal one from the 
organizational outlook. 
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In his most relevant work, "A Theory of Justice", John Rawls (2006) provides 
more analytical elements to justify a concept and a "conception of justice" as well as 
“distributional shares", providing grounds for differential governmental actions geared 
to protect people and to justify public policies aimed at reducing social inequalities and 
providing more equitable opportunities for citizens. This specific point will be resumed 
further. 
The core thesis of Rawls is to establish what he calls the "two principles of 
justice" - the principle of equality, and the principle of difference. On account of that, 
he develops a series of reasoning that supports the antecedent (justification) and the 
consequent (application) of both principles. Further, in a specific chapter, he presents 
what he calls "distributional shares" and how they can be forged for the implementation 
of those principles of justice. 
According to the author, it is required a set of principles to frame one social 
organization that would dictate the distribution of the advantages and would set an 
agreement on how appropriate the distributive shares should be. These streamlines 
are the principles of social justice, enabling rights and duties to "basic institutions" of 
the society and defining how benefits will be appropriated and how duties of social 
cooperation will be imposed (RAWLS, 2006, p.5). 
Rawls states that people are born in different social positions, what implies on 
life expectations - in the sense of personal growth possibilities. These expectations are 
reinforced both by political systems and economic or social circumstances. These 
inequalities, stemmed from different social start points, are deep and cannot be justified 
by the idea of merit (RAWLS, 2006 p.8-9). 
Furthermore, he distinguishes a concept of justice from a conception of justice. 
The first one refers to the proper balance between conflicting demands, while the 
second one relates to the set of principles that identify "significant considerations" in 
determining balance. The role of these principles attributing rights and duties and 
defining the appropriate division of social advantages are definite factors of the concept 
of justice (RAWLS, 2006, p.12) 
Devoted to the Social Contract theory of Locke and Rousseau, presenting 
himself as a "Kantian-constructive" thinker, Rawls borrows the idea of a "state of 
nature" to metaphorize an "original position" that would be "the appropriate status quo 
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to ensure that fundamental agreements are equitable." Hence, the idea of "justice as 
fairness" relates to the situation in which the participants would only adopt rational and 
equitable principles. 
To be accepted by the entire society, these premises or principles must be as 
comprehensive as possible, to the point of encompassing the most diverse personal 
aspirations and circumstances (RAWLS, 2006, p.21). In order to explain this, he makes 
use of another metaphor, "the veil of ignorance", which would be the absence of 
knowledge of the original position of the party when making political decisions. 
The concepts of original position, veil of ignorance and rational justification 
applied to political decisions altogether, outline principles of justice as the ones in which 
people, driven by the fulfillment of their concerns, would accept boundaries of equality 
on natural or social contingencies (RAWLS, 2006, p.23). 
Given these assumptions, Rawls (2006, p.73) builds on the two principles of 
justice, which, by their importance are transcribed: 
 
 
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, whose scheme is compatible with 
the same scheme of liberties for all; Second Principle: Social and economic 
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: a) They are to be attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; b) 
They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of 
society (the difference principle). 
 
 
These two principles of justice are the basis of the author's theory. Unfolding 
them, he presents his idea of "distributive justice," which relates to other concepts he 
conceives of, such as "distributive shares", "primary goods", "pure procedural justice" 
and “basic institutions”. 
These concepts provide a substantial basis for one idea of tax justice or, at 
least, for one more solid philosophical foundation of the theme. When Rawls presents 
his "distributional shares", he provides a theoretical framework for a disparate 
treatment between diverse ones in a society molded by institutions, people and values 
which are the most divergent ones, tending to perform the idea of "social choice"7. 
                                                          
7 The most usual expression would be “social welfare" rather than "social choice", but Rawls reject this 
concept because, he argues, it has a suggestion of utilitarianism. It is exactly the pure utilitarianism he 
wishes to avoid as the foundations of a Theory of Justice. At the end of the book he accepts certain 
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In Rawls, the idea of distributive justice, unfolding the principles of justice, is 
based on the meaningful choices for the conception on how the distributive shares will 
be minted. Such choices have moral, political and economic foundations, regardless 
of specific needs and desires of the current members in a set historical time (RAWLS, 
2006 p.325-327). 
He resorts again to the metaphor of the "original position," deeming it as the 
constructive philosophical foundation that Kant has given to the "general will", 
conceived by Rousseau (RAWLS, 2006, p.328). In it, the eventual intergenerational 
conflict over the allocation of wealth and the notion of fair savings between generations 
would be solved by "precepts of justice." 
For the author, only a few issues of political economy have relevance enough 
to be worked out in the theory of justice: the proper rate of fair savings between 
generations8; the basic organization of taxation and private property, and, finally, what 
may be the social minimum amount of one society (RAWLS, 2006, p.330). 
Rawls thoroughly concerns for taxation and private property, in what he calls 
the “distribution sector”. Both elements stem from his two principles of justice. The 
inheritance tax, the progressive income taxation system and the legal definition of self-
ownership should ensure equal freedom in a citizen-owner democracy, as well as the 
fair value of the rights established by such instruments. On the other hand, proportional 
taxes on consumption or on income, must provide revenue for public policies, for social 
benefits agencies and for equitable educational offer, in order to implement the second 
principle (RAWLS, 2006, p.348). 
Therefore, in both phases, the taxation system and the private property regime 
would handle the unequal ones in a disparate manner not allowing an unreasonable 
increase of inequality, as well as, in the second phase, providing the basis for an 
equalization on the "acceptable social minimum amount" through transfers of an 
equitable supply of opportunities. 
                                                          
dosage of utilitarianism in the construction of the concept of justice, though this is not the substrate of 
the concept and does not dictate the process of choosing what is fair. 
8 Rawls raises the question of how to ensure that one generation does not harm the next one. The 
answer, again, is the veil of ignorance, suggesting that the settlers on the original position do not know 
what generation they will belong to. He introduces the idea that one generation will always aim to 
improve the life of their direct descendants. In order to do this, he conceived the idea of fair savings, 
which, in short, consists on the wealth produced by a generation to improve its quality of life, but partly 
spare to a future generation, that must do the same to the subsequent one. 
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The compliance to both principles of justice implies the definition of an 
adequate rate of savings and a criterion for the social minimum amount, raising the 
expectations for the underprivileged through transfers and benefits provided by 
essential public policies to be compatible with the expectations of equal liberties 
(RAWLS, 2006, p.377). The distribution through this basic structure will result in justice 
(or at least absence of injustice), at least in what it means by pure procedural justice. 
Rawls outlined reasons, foundations and purposes for a divergent treatment 
among citizens, including a different tax treatment as well (LOVETTI, 2013). That is, if 
his theory points to the embodiment of a fair society, it encompasses a fair tax operation 
as well. 
Rawls theory is not immune to criticisms, as nothing in science, much less in 
the philosophical field. Roberto Gargarella (2008), for instance, points out some 
criticisms made by Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen and General Cohen on some traits 
of the Theory of Justice, specifically on the justification of inequality in the second 
principle of justice and on the luck factor in the distribution of the primary goods. 
However, such criticisms do not undermine the relevance of the theory, since it seeks 
to provide a systematic response to a fair operational society. 
 
 
5  A CONCEPT OS RAWLSIAN TAX JUSTICE 
   
As we have seen, the gathering of elements about justice in Aristotle, Hans 
Kelsen and John Rawls are useful to the understanding of the theme of this work. In 
the first and third authors, the concept of justice permeates a priori an idea of equal 
treatment between people and, posteriori, a treatment according to some rules of 
justification9, allowing a divergent treatment between unequal ones. 
The aim of this work, grounded on these theories, is to connect the idea of 
justice to the tax system. Most of the works10 on this theme – taxation and justice - 
                                                          
9 Aristotle speaks of proportionality according to the merit. 
10 Many writings about tax justice are presented by economists rather than jurists, like Adam Smith, H. 
M. Goves and J. M. Keynes. This author identifies the commitment of economists on the lack of interest 
of jurists and philosophers on the subject. (TIPKE, 2012, p.12). Adam Smith, in his masterpiece "Uma 
Investigação sobre a Natureza e as Causas da Riqueza das Nações”, since 1776, devised four 
principles for tax justice. The first, which he called quality, consists of the "tax" must respect the measure 
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assume that tax justice basically consists of a more burdensome tax treatment to those 
who possess higher wealth and a lesser one to those who do not have it. 
It is in Rawls that one finds a theoretical arrangement on which it is possible to 
structure a more precise idea of tax justice. As previously said, his theory is not immune 
to criticisms, and the screening of some of its aspects is required. As an example, there 
is an underestimation of the distortion that original inequality promotes, specifically in 
countries where it is very noticeable, such as Brazil. What should be considered, 
however, is that it was a work written by an American citizen in the 1950s and 1960s, 
that is, in a society with low inequality levels and fully afforded with primary goods. 
Like any classical work, however, Rawls's theory provides tools for the 
assembling of the most diverse theoretical outputs – the current paper intends to make 
use of them for the discussion of tax justice starting from his concept of "proper balance 
between conflicting demands". Therefore, what would be the conflicting demands of 
tax justice? Moreover, what would be the proper balance of such requirements? 
Based on the society of citizens-owners fashioned by Rawls, in this spotlight, 
taxpayers with "equal rights to the most extensive system of equal fundamental 
freedoms", must be granted equality in the distribution of the tax burden and the 
respect to their ability to pay. To these elements of tax equality, it must be added a key 
principle of the system, the prohibition of the confiscatory taxation. Agricultural  
On the other hand, the State, whenever framing the tax system, must seek the 
most adequate economic basis - exercising a "conception of justice" (in Rawls's words) 
-once it would be bound to choose the fairest relevant conditions - in order to raise the 
financing of "basic institutions". These conditions, in turn, would be responsible for the 
provision of "primary goods" for the implementation of the “social minimum amount" as 
well as for the distribution of equal opportunities (such as in educational issues). 
That is, tax justice would be the appropriate balance between these two 
conflicting demands. On one hand, the right to equality, non-confiscatory taxation and 
the respect for taxpayer's ability to pay; and on the other hand, the need for the State 
                                                          
of the capacities of the subjects. The second is certainty, assuring the tax must not be arbitrary. The 
third tax principle is the convenience of payment: tax collection must be related to the time of the 
economic gain. For example, a tax on farming production must match with the harvest season. The forth 
principle is related to the collection economy itself: the collection cannot be more expensive than the 
revenue it provides (SMITH, 1999). 
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to implement the second principle of justice, id est, the "difference principle", by means 
of "distributive shares", to bring citizens closer even if they are from different social 
stratus. 
Certainly, the core debate in contemporary democracies is in this balance. 
Since this is an approximate idea of what society perceives by its purposes, if the 
objectives of the various groups within it are divergent, tax justice will consist of non-
abusive state funding, being, however, adequate for the reach of a minimum well-being 
state. 
This work aims to go further, going beyond the fluid concepts of justice 




6  CURRENT CASES OF TAX INJUSTICE IN BRAZIL 
 
From now on it will be presented five11 current situations that break the 
appropriate balance between the conflicting requirements mentioned above, whether 
by not observing the actual taxpayers' ability to pay, by underfunding the economic 
bases of distributive justice, or even both at the same time. 
The most emblematic example is the fact that the Federal Government has 
never exercised its taxation power regarding the wealth tax – Large Fortunes Tax - 
foreseen in item VII of article 153 of the Constitution of the Republic of Brazil, dating 
from 1988. The reasons seem to be obvious: this is not only an economic matter over 
the risk of capital flight12, but it is also a political choice since among the 513 
congressmen elected to the 2014-2018 legislature, almost half of them are millionaire, 
an increasing ratio in each legislature13. This lack of taxation not only violates the 
                                                          
11 Within the Brazilian tax system, there are dozens of cases in which there is a notorious injustice in 
respect of the ability to pay principle. 
12 Thomas Piketty does not neglect the possibility of capital flight to countries with mild taxation in case 
of the institution of this tax. For this, he suggests, in a utopian way, a world tax on capital. As an 
alternative to this, he claims a major international cooperation in tax matters and, moreover, 
transparency in the financial data (PIKETTY, 2014). 
13 This data, related to the last national elections as well as the private funding of campaigns, reveals 
that politics has become a locus of wealthy people (REIS, 2006). 
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Ability-To-Pay Taxation principle, but also fails to raise a large mass of resources that 
would be extremely useful for the financing of public policies14. 
A viable way out for such omission would be the increase of tax rates on 
inheritance. Currently, Resolution 9 of the Federal Senate, based on item IV of 
paragraph, article 155 of the Federal Constitution, establishes the maximum rate of 
8%. In this matter, Piketty (2014) also points out that taxation on inheritance has an 
essential role of reducing the immediate concentration of assets. For Rawls (2006), 
similarly, the progressive taxation on inheritance would restore the primary role of merit 
in the capitalist society. 
Another case of clear tax injustice is the absence of taxation on the income of 
the individual on profits and dividends from one legal entity. In other words, an 
entrepreneur who as a natural person earns millionaire profits, will not have this 
amount taxed. Differently, one employee whose income is above the exemption range 
of R$ 28,559.70 (approx. US$ 7,500.00) for the last fiscal year, will be bound to collect 
the mentioned income tax. 
According to a study of the International Center for Inclusive Growth Policies 
for the United Nations Development Program (PNUD), out of 71,000 ultra-rich 
Brazilians (over 4 million reais income per year; approx. one million dollars), about 
50,000 of them earned dividends in 2013 and paid nothing on that (GOBETTI, 2016). 
This condition leads Brazil, as well as Estonia, as the only two countries, including 
members and key partners of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which do not tax this economic base.  
This same study has made some estimates on the income tax legislation, since 
the implementation of some more tax brackets (35%, 40% and 45%), to the taxation 
of dividends with one single tax rate. Depending on the scenario, it could increase the 
collection to finance basic public policies from 43 to 72 billion reais (approx. 11 to 19 
billion dollars) reducing inequalities. 
Moreover, there are several situations where income over capital is taxed 
exclusively at the source, with one single proportional rate, taxing less the income on 
                                                          
14 Within the Brazilian National Congress there are dozens of legislative proposals to implement the 
Great Wealth Tax (IGF). In one of the them, the PLC 130/2012, adopting a 1.2% rate, there should be 
an increase of R$ 12.66 billion (US$ 3 Billion) in tax collection, according to the latest IRS data. 
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capital than income on salary, overturning the progressive tax system. This opposes 
to the Constitution directives, since it does not allow discrimination based on the 
occupation or function exercised by taxpayers, regardless of the legal denomination of 
income, titles or rights ( MARIA; LUCHIEZI JR.; 2010). 
Yet on the income taxation matter, it can also be mentioned the non-correction 
of the tax table income as patently unfair, which makes tributes even more regressive, 
since people in the lower income brackets are the ones who are mostly affected by 
inflation. 
One more scenario, regarding the taxation capability of the member-states, is 
the position of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) to deny the taxation of Motor Vehicle 
Property Tax (IPVA) on vessels and aircrafts, something that opposes to the ability-to-
pay principle. Such understanding fosters an unfair situation: a wage earner citizen 
who purchases his first automobile, fully financed, is obliged to pay IPVA at a tabletop 
list price, whereas a millionaire yacht or aircraft owner does not have to pay such tax 
on these properties. The reasons for this instance are some leading cases of the STF, 
such as Extraordinary Appeals RE 134.509/AM15 and RE 379.572/RJ16, which barred 
member-state laws from outlining this taxation hypothesis, stating that, due to the fact 




7  PROGRESSIVE TAXATION SYSTEM AND TAX JUSTICE 
 
Having been demonstrated the significance of tax justice and, on the other 
hand, some examples of their misapplication in Brazil, the theory of Klaus Tipke (2012), 
about taxation and morality outlined at his work State and Taxpayer Morale 
                                                          
15 SUPREME COURT. RE 134509. IPVA - Tax on Property of Motor Vehicles (Federal Constitution, 
article n. 155, III; Federal Constitution 69, article 23, III e § 13, Federal Constitution. EC 27/85). No 
taxation on vessels and aircraft. Reporter: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence. Full Court, judged on 2002 May 
29, DJ 2002 Sep 13. 
16 SUPREME COURT. RE 379572. Extraordinary Appeal. Tax Law. 2. There is no Tax on Property of 
Motor Vehicles (IPVA) on vessels (Article n. 155, III, Federal Constitution/1988 and Article n.23, III and 
§ 13, Federal Constitution/1967 according to EC 01/69 and EC 27/85). Precedents. 3. Extraordinary 
Appeal known and granted. Reporter: Min. Gilmar Mendes, Full Court, judged on 2007 Apr 11, Dje-018. 
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(Besteuerungsmoral und Steuermoral), seems to be a good fit for understanding the 
role of taxation to deal with social inequality. 
The author, also admitting the problem on the conception of tax justice in the 
German legal system, given the vagueness of the term, enlightens that it does not 
conceptualize justice, sustaining that the equality principle is an outcome of this idea. 
Going further, he states that, under the Constitutional State, offenses of liberties can 
also bring an offense to justice. Furthermore, the Social State, referring to justice, also 
comprises social justice. 
Despite the conceptual imprecision, tax collection has a major legal protection 
to the point that tax evasion is considered a felony – a serious crime – in almost all 
developed countries. This is easily understood because it not only affects the primary 
interest of the State, but also it harms honest taxpayers who will have to bear the 
burden of the evader. The evader breaks down the solidarity of the community of 
taxpayers (TIPKE, 2012). 
Klaus Tipke states that the key issues involving tax policy are addressed by 
economists rather than lawyers. At first, such decisions are taken in the economic 
sphere, later on they are adjusted into law. That is why the work of Thomas Piketty, 
"Capital in the 21st Century"17, is quite meaningful. It demonstrates, with plenty of data 
of the last decades, the relation between capital accumulation and the increase of 
inequality, sustaining that when the capital interest rate is higher than the economic 
growth ratio, it fosters inequalities to unbearable rates, which radically threatens 
meritocracy (PIKETTY, 2014). 
Some conclusions of Piketty, regarding the role of taxation to solve social 
inequality, are significant to be drawn for the purpose of this work. Coherently with the 
notion of tax justice, he asserts that taxes are not only a technical financial problem, 
but the most imperative political and philosophical matter of the State, since they 
finance public policies, being the tax issues at the core of all political revolutions. For 
instance, the withdrawal of tax privileges in the revolutionary France or the "No taxation 
without representation" movement in the British colonies in America in the context of 
the American Revolution (PIKETTY, 2014, p.480). 
                                                          
17 Piketty has collected official wealth record data from more than twenty countries over the past three 
centuries. 
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Piketty claims that pure proportionality in taxation has direct relation to the 
structure of inequality. For him, in the opposite sense, it seems to indicate that 
progressivity in higher incomes and in inheritances have detained wealth concentration 
after the two world wars, not allowing to reach concentration of wealth levels of the 
Belle Époque. He supports that the huge fall in the progressiveness of high-income 
taxation in the United States and the United Kingdom from 1970-1980 largely explains 
the leap in higher concentration income. 
"Progressive income and inheritance taxes have played an important role 
during the twentieth century, but they are being threatened by 'tax competition' across 
countries" (PIKETTY, 2014, p.482-483). This statement does not apply to Brazil, but to 
countries where these taxes are higher. In Brazil, those rates are relatively low. For the 
income tax, it starts at 15% going to 27.5%, and for the inheritance and assets 
transmission taxes it reaches 8% (SINDIFISCO, 2017), whereas in Europe, according 
to Sacha Calmon, it can reach up to 80% for more distant relatives (COÊLHO, 2012, p. 
328). 
The failure on the implementation of a proper progressiveness in the taxation 
system consists, by a transverse mean, in establishing regressiveness, what may 
cause the deterioration of the legitimacy of the tax system before most of the 
population, since the middle and the lower classes may no longer accept to pay 
proportionately to most public expenditures. For Piketty, this prognosis entails 
individualism and selfishness in society (PIKETTY, 2014). 
It is possible to go beyond this reflection made by the French economist and 
support that the illegitimacy of the tax system increases tax evasion and informal 
economy as well, reducing the fiscal administration power of the governments against 





 Despite a universal concept of justice has not been achieved by the authors 
mentioned above, it is possible to get closer to what would be this phenomenon. 
Whether making use of equity, proportion, or merit as measures, as Aristotle has 
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suggested, or by associating it with normative values, as advocated by Hans Kelsen, 
or, more analytically, as John Rawls did, taking that as the appropriate balance 
between conflicting interests, these reasonings can, at least, exclude what is not justice 
all about. 
Assuming these ideas, rearranged to tax law, associated with unequal 
treatment of the unequal ones, and the Aristotelian notion of "merit", in this specific 
field, the figure of tax progressivity takes place. For Rawls, the idea of tax justice relies 
on the balance of opposing interests - of the State representing the collectivity versus 
the individual in defense of his patrimony - in an appropriate way. It can also be 
deduced from him that the functioning of a fair society requires a fair taxation system 
as well. 
The balance of this tax collection can only be dictated by a democratic debate 
among all concerned parties involved. The discrepancy at the top of the income 
earnings should not limit the equal opportunity for the members of the society and 
inhibit economic growth. Going beyond the vague concepts dealt over here demands 
a prompt response to a dynamic problem. This is something that not even the 
previously classical authors dare to do. 
Some instances of the Brazilian legal system can be pointed as cases of tax 
injustice. This occur by the disrespect to the ability-to-pay principle. As examples 
mentioned above, the neglected taxation on large fortunes, the little taxation on 
inheritances in Brazil, and the absence of the individual income taxation on profits and 
dividends of the legal entity. Moreover, the taxation on capital gain is lighter than 
taxation on wages, and the government negligence on the income table tax update 
produces more injustice at the bottom of the economic pyramid – not to mention the 
non-taxation of IPVA on boats and airplanes.  
Based on data dealing with the income concentration and the tax collection 
increase, it is possible to point out that the progressivity on higher incomes and 
inheritances helps to hinder the concentration of assets. However, this may display a 
mitigated role considering the international competition undertaken by several 
countries, offering a more satisfactory tax treatment to draw capital. 
Therefore, the non-implementation of a proper progressivity on taxation 
consists, by transverse ways, of establishing a regressively system of taxation on 
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inheritance and incomes. This provokes the erosion of the legitimacy of the tributary 
system, specifically before the middle and lower social classes, that may not tolerate 
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